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THE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: A NEED
FOR LIMITS ON LIABILITY
William H. Theis*
Although the common law long has accepted emotional harm as
an elenent of damages recoverable under traditional tort theories,
the Second Restatement established the intentional infliction of
emotional distress as an independent tort. Professor Theis argues
that the Restatement has generated, rather than restated, the law,
and has created liability ranging over a broad and unpredictable
variety of interests. This Article examines the development of case
law before and after the adoption of the Restatement doctrine,
concluding that the law should protect emotional tranquility only
as it relates to interests themselves worthy of legal protection.
The common law long has compensated for the infliction of emo-
tional distress arising from intentional torts. 1 For example, the vic-
tim of a false imprisonment may recover, in addition to other items of
damages, for the emotional distress effected by the confinement. 2
Yet for some time the common law resisted the adoption of a general
principle of liability. 3 It refused to grant damages for intentionally
inflicted emotional distress unless they were a consequence of be-
havior tortious on independent grounds. 4  After much struggle, 5 the
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University School of Law; A.B., Loyola University of
Chicago; J.D., Northwestern University; LL.M., Columbia University. The author would like to
thank Professors Charles Frankel, R. Kent Greenawalt, and Ernest Nagel of Columbia Univer-
sity for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Their generosity does not imply
agreement with the views of the author.
1. See Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L.
REV. 1033 (1936).
2. See, e.g., Whittaker v. Sandford, 110 Me. 77, 85 A. 399 (1912).
3. In other legal systems, liability for emotional distress has had a broader base. See W.
BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 589-92 (2d ed.
1950); F. LAWSON, A. ANTON & L. BROWN, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 209-10 (2d ed.
1963); M. PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVL LAW § 868A (11th ed. 1939) (La. State Law Inst.
English trans.); Catala & Weir, Delict and Torts: A Study in Parallel, 38 TUL. L. REV. 663,
677-82 (1964); Wade, Tort Liability for Abusive and Insulting Language, 4 VAND. L. REV. 63,
64 & nn. 9-10 (1950) (ancient Germanic law); Note, Injuria in Corpus juris Civilis, 50 B.U.L.
REV. 271 (1970).
4. Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L. Cas. 577, 11 Eng. Rpts. 854 (1861) sets out the common law
view of recovery for emotional distress: "Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does
not redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone."
Id. at 598, 11 Eng. Rpts. at 863.
Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033
(1936) and Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REV. 40 (1956), set out the pertinent
background.
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Restatement (Second) of Torts (hereinafter referred to as Restatement)
has come to. recognize such a general principle. 6  Although it relies
on prior cases, the Restatement in this area has generated the law
more than it has restated it. The Restatement position is a healthy
one to the extent that it focuses on general principles not dependent
on the plaintiff's bringing himself within one of the traditional com-
mon law writs. However helpful generalizations may be in bringing
order into a common law once fragmented by the writ system,
generalization has its perils too. The Restatement, and especially the
more recent cases influenced by it, give insufficient attention to some
fundamental limitations which should attach to any generalizations
about recovery for emotional distress.
The Restatement visits liability on one who, by outrageous conduct,
intentionally or recklessly causes another person severe emotional dis-
tress. In theory, the doctrine contains serious hurdles for the plaintiff
to overcome. He must establish that the defendant's conduct went
beyond "all possible bounds of decency," 7 and that the defendant was
at least indifferent to the emotional consequences of such conduct. 8
Moreover, the plaintiff must prove that his emotional distress was
severe; that is, that the distress went beyond the momentary an-
noyance that all of us suffer every day as a result of trivial unpleas-
antness or disappointment. 9  Although in practice; the potential for
5. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (1934 & Supp. 1948) provided:
Except as stated in §§ 21 to 34 [assault] and § 48 [special liability of common
carriers for insult], conduct which is intended or which though not so intended is
likely to cause only a mental or emotional disturbance to another does not subject
the actor to liability (a) for emotional distress arising therefrom, or (b) for bodily
harm unexpectably arising from such disturbance.
An interim version of 1948 had provided: One who, without a privilege to do so,
intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another is liable (a) for such emo-
tional distress, and (b) for bodily harm resulting friom it.
6. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT] pro-
vides:
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional dis-.
tress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability
if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
(a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at the time,
whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress results in
bodily harm.
Id. § 46.
7. Id., Comment d.
8. Id., Comment i.
9. Id., Comments j, k.
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sham claims is great, the Restatement indicates confidence in the
judiciary's ability to separate fact from fiction.' 0
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AS AN INDEPENDENT TORT
The Restatement represents a triumph for the long-embattled prop-
osition that emotional harm is just as "real" as the physical harm of,
for example, a broken arm." Emotional distress had long been sus-
pect because of the fear that it could be feigned too easily. In the
past, it was compensable only as an incident of behavior tortious on
traditional grounds, because the traditional grounds 12 were thought
to assure the legitim acy of the claimed emotional distress. The Re-
statement solidly recognizes that the law should protect a person's
emotional integrity just as broadly as his physical integrity. ' Ac-
cording to the Restatement, both physical and emotional integrity are
capable of invasion and, when invaded, essentially similar loss is
caused to the plaintiff, regardless of the means employed to effect the
invasion. 14
In this generalization, the Restatement has ignored important limi-
tations. Although emotional distress may be just as "real" as physical
injury, it is somewhat more variegated than physical harm. Bodily
injury has a unitary nature in the sense that an injury resulting in a
broken arm is no more nor less worthy of compensation than an in-
jury resulting in a broken leg. Emotional distress lacks this unitary
quality. One may worry about his physical safety or the safety of his
family, or may be beset with anxiety over an insurance policy not
honored. He may be horrified that someone has committed suicide in
his presence. He may be emotionally wounded from insults to his
honor or dignity, effected by crude, unflattering comments. In all
these instances, the individual may suffer emotional distress, and the
courts may be able to verify its existence as well as its severity. Al-
though the genuineness of emotional distress may have long troubled
the courts, their confidence in their ability to sort out fact from fiction
leaves open the question of whether any and all emotional distress
should be compensable. The Restatement answers in the affirmative,
10. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 51 (4th ed. 1971).
11. See, e.g., Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MIcH. L. REV. 497
(1922); Smith, Relation of Emotion to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30
VA. L. REV. 193 (1944); Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARv. L. REV. 260 (1921).
12. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 46, Comment b.
13. "This section may be regarded as an extension of the princi,'le[s] involved in ... the
tort of assault." Id.
14. Id., Comment k.
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at least when the defendant's conduct is outrageous and intentional
and when the plaintiff's injury is severe.
This broad protection, even with the limitations just noted, cannot
be supported. Although the law may protect emotional tranquility on
a great range of interests, it cannot and should not promote emotional
tranquility as to any and all interests. Rather, the law should protect
emotional tranquility only as it relates to interests themselves worthy
of legal protection.
An interest in honor is a key area drawing into question the gener-
ality embodied in the Restatement. The cases from which the Re-
statement is drawn do not support protection of honor and dignity as
independent interests. More importantly, no adequate justification
exists for such protection. Indeed, compelling reasons stand opposed
to this protection.
HONOR AND DIGNITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL
A. Pre-Restatement Cases
The classic cases upon which the Restatement relies protected emo-
tional tranquility in some important respects, but they did not protect
emotional tranquility with respect to honor or dignity. For example,
in Wilkinson v. Downtown,15 the plaintiff recovered for emotional
distress when the defendant told her, as a prank, that her husband
was seriously injured.16 In State Rubbish Collectors Association v.
Siliznoff, 17 the defendants threatened the plaintiff with bodily harm,
but their threats lacked the immediacy to bring the case within the
traditional confines of assault.18 If the court in Wilkinson had con-
fined its analysis narrowly to a theory of misrepresentation, the plain-
tiff would have received only minimal damages-the cost of her
transportation to the hospital to make inquiries of her husband. In
Siliznoff, the plaintiff would have been awarded no damages, since no
assault took place. Yet in both cases, an important interest was made
15. 2 Q.B. 57 (1897).
16. A number of cases recognize the plaintiff's interest in the well-being of his family. A
defendant who interferes with peace of mind on this score subjects himself to liability. Savage v.
Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954); Korbin v. Berlin, 177 So.2d 551 (Fla. App. 1965);
Knierim v. Izzo, 22 IIl.2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961); Ruiz v. Bertolotti, 236 N.Y.S.2d 854 (Sup.
Ct. 1962); Rockhill v. Pollard, 259 Ore. 54, 485 P.2d 28 (1971); Schurk v. Christensen, 80
Wash.2d 652, 497 P.2d 937 (1972); Bielitski v. Obadiak, 61 Dom. L. Rep. 494 (1921).
17. 38 Cal.2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952).
18. Accord, Wilson v. Wilkins, 181 Ark. 137, 25 S.W.2d 428 (1930); Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1931); Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208
N.W. 814 (1926); Seidel v. Greenberg, 108 N.J. Super. 248, 260 A.2d 863 (1969); Janvier v.
Sweeney, [1919] 2 K.B. 316.
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the object of emotional distress: the safety of oneself or of a loved
one. In those cases, recovery protected legitimate, fundamental
interests not included in the traditional forms of action.
Nickerson v. Hodges,19 the famous Louisiana "pot of gold" case, is
often thought to grant broad protection for emotional tranquility. Yet
even that case does not go so far as to protect assault on the dignity
and honor of the individual. In Nickerson, the defendants perpetrated
a crude practical joke on a woman who honestly believed that she
could find buried treasure left behind by her relatives. The defen-
dants buried a sack of rocks which they helped the woman to find.
The unopened sack was put into a bank overnight for safekeeping and
was to be opened the next morning before the entire town. After the
deposit and outside the woman's presence, the bank officers opened
the sack that night to verify its contents. When they discovered the
rocks, they resealed the sack. When the sack was opened the next
morning, the woman became greatly distraught. Her distress did not
arise from the realization that she had been made the butt of a practi-
cal joke. Rather, seeing that the sack had been opened and resealed,
she thought that someone had stolen the gold and replaced the con-
tents with worthless rocks. Although the whole town knew what had
actually happened and laughed at her expense, the woman's distress
resulted from her deeply held conviction that her property had been
stolen. She regarded herself as the victim of a theft, not of a practical
joke. Her emotional distress over this loss of property underlies the
finding of liability.20
One case relied upon by the Restatement does not appear to tie
emotional distress to a legally protected interest. In Blakeley v. Es-
tate of Shortal,21 the court granted recovery to a homeowner whose
neighbor committed suicide in the plaintiff's home and thereby
created emotional distress for the plaintiff homeowner. Although the
emotional distress may have been quite real, it is difficult to pinpoint
the interest protected in this case. The plaintiff evidently had no fear
for her own safety. The opinion hints that the emotional distress im-
paired full enjoyment of her home. 22  This case, more than any
19. 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920).
20. Admittedly, the court's opinion in this case is not clearly written and has created confu-
sion. The opinion characterized the plaintiff's petition as seeking, among other elements, recov-
ery for "humiliation" and "injury to . . . social standing." Yet the court's recitation of the evi-
dence makes it clear that the plaintiff steadfastly believed, even until her death that the gold
existed and that it had been stolen. (The plaintiff died before trial, and her survivors were
substituted.)
21. 236 Iowa 787, 20 N.W.2d 28 (1945).
22. Id. at 789, 20 N.W.2d at 30.
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other, suggests that compensable emotional distress need not be tied
to some independent interest of the plaintiff. Yet even this case does
not suggest that insult or affront to honor can support recovery.
Indeed, the cases have stressed for some time that one may not be
held liable for emotional distress caused by insults or attacks on
another's honor. 23 To this general rule there was an exception. Pub-
lic carriers and innkeepers were liable to patrons and guests for rude
and insulting conduct. 24
This exception does not give much indication of a general judicial
attitude toward emotional distress. The first American case granting
recovery against a common carrier for insulting language 2 5 stressed
that a captain .of a ship, by virtue of the ship's peculiar isolation from
the rest of the world, has a special responsibility toward his passen-
gers. The captain has them in his physical control, and they cannot
escape his influence. Hence, the law implies in the contract of car-
riage a condition of kind and courteous treatment toward the passen-
gers. 26
Although one may characterize recovery in the innkeeper or in the
common carrier situation as sounding in "tort," not in "contract," 27 it
would be simplistic to overlook the special contractual nature of the
relationship. 28  The patron or passenger expects that he will receive
courteous service. First, he has paid for that amenity. Second, even
when not at sea, the most extreme case, he often has no realistic
opportunity to avoid unpleasantness directed at him. To extrapolate
from these cases a general rule that all persons have a right to a
courteous treatment of their sensibilities ignores these special cir-
cumstances. The innkeeper and common carrier cases go very far in
imposing a duty, even when fellow guests or passengers engage in
insulting behavior. 29 If these cases are not "isolated phenomena,"
but examples of a general rule, then everyone has a duty to shield
others from whatever insults may be offered in his presence. Since no
23. See, e.g., Bartow v. Smith, 149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N.E.2d 735 (1948).
24. See Wade, supra note 3, at 66-70.
25. Chimberlain v. Chandler, 5 F. Cas. 413 (C.C.D. Mass. 1823) (No. 2575).
26. See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 9.3 (1956).
27. See Magruder, supra note 1, at 1052.
28. Modern cases increasingly recognize performance of a contractual obligation by the de-
fendant as a legitimate object of the plaintiff's emotional tranquility. See Hanke v. Global Van
Lines, Inc., 533 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1976); Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1
(7th Cir. 1972); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, 66 Cal.2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13 (1967); Johnson v. Women's Hospital, 527 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. App. 1975).
29. See, e.g., Gillespie v. Brooklyn Heights R.R. Co., 178 N.Y. 347, 70 N.E. 857 (1904).
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one has been willing to press these cases so far,30 one must question
whether they do, as claimed, have a general significance.
B. Post-Restatement Cases
The Restatement clearly embodies the proposition that if an insult
is outrageous and causes severe emotional distress, then liability will
result. In theory, only "petty" or "trivial" insults will escape liabil-
ity. 31  But since outrageousness and severity of the distress are jury
questions, the court has little control over the extent of protection. It
is erroneous to assume that, by definition, insults cannot meet the
requirements for Restatement liability. Two cases inspired by the Re-
statement illustrate that insult or affront to honor may result in a lia-
bility more expansive than previously recognized.
In Halio v. Lurie, 32 the defendant wrote taunting letters to a
former sweetheart, in which he reminded her of unfulfilled expecta-
tions of marriage. Defendant's conduct was of an insulting, derisive
sort in which most persons would not care to indulge. The plaintiff
alleged that she could not sleep or eat, and was obliged to consult a
physician. In reliance on the Restatement, the court held that the
complaint stated a cause of action.
Likewise, in Alcorn v. Albro Engineering, Inc., 33 the court held
that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action for insults effected
through the use of racial epithets. The plaintiff strengthened the case
by alleging that the defendant knew or should have known that
members of the plaintiff's race are peculiarly susceptible to emotional
stress resulting fiom the use of such epithets. 34 The plaintiff's allega-
tions of shock, nausea, and insomnia were held to establish a cause of
action for the intentional infliction of severe emotional distress. 35
30. To do so would create a curious exception to the "Good Samaritan" doctrine.
31. Comments to the RESTATEMENT seem to support the traditional rule:
The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, an-
noyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. The rough edges of our society are
still in need of a good deal of filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs must
necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough
language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind. There
is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case where someone's feelings are
hurt. There must still be freedom to express an unflattering opinion, and some
safety valve must be left through which irascible tempers may blow off relatively
harmless steam.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 46, Comment d.
32. 15 App. Div. 2d 62, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1961).
33. 2 Cal.3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970).
34. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 46, Comments f, j.
35. Accord, Conteras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash.2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977).




Of course, it is not sufficient to say that emotional distress over
insults or attacks on honor was not traditionally compensable and,
therefore, that it never should be compensable. Alcorn indicates at
least one situation in which the invocation of the traditional rule
would seem hardhearted and, indeed, racist. Thus, support of the
traditional rule on insults must be subject to further analysis.
C. Critique of the Restatement View
The analysis of the Restatement view begins with a more general
proposition: that the law should protect against the infliction of emo-
tional distress only to the extent that it stands willing to protect the
object of the emotional distress. Since the law protects personal se-
curity, property, and relations with others, 36 it protects emotional
tranquility as to those objects. But if the law does not protect a par-
ticular interest, it should not attempt to secure emotional tranquility
as to that interest. Consider a case recently reported in the newspa-
pers,3 7 in which parents sued their daughter for sending out wedding
invitations under their name. They claimed emotional distress be-
cause they did not approve of the proposed marriage. No doubt their
emotional distress was severe, as claimed, but no one would suggest
that the parents have a protectable interest in preventing third par-
ties from believing or erroneously inferring that they approved their
daughter's choice of spouse. Their emotional distress over the daugh-
ter's generation of this inference should stand on no better footing.
The Restatement implicitly treats emotional tranquility as an inter-
est in and of itself, exempting only minor breaches of that tranquil-
ity. 3 8  It is temptingly erroneous for the law to equate emotional
health with physical health, especially when the two are so in-
tertwined on a clinical level. If the plaintiff has a protectable interest
in his physical integrity, then it might seem to follow that this inter-
est includes emotional tranquility, regardless of the source of distur-
36. See L. GREEN, W. PEDRICK, J. RAHL, E. THODE, C. HAWKINS, A. SMITH & J.
TREECE, CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 2-3 (2d ed. 1977).
37. Baton Rouge Sunday Advocate, Sept. 4, 1977, at 17-A, col 4.
38., Comment j provides:
Complete emotional tranquility is seldom attainable in this world, and some de-
gree of transient and trivial emotional distress is a part of the price of living
among people. The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe
that no reasonable man could he expected to endure it. The intensity and the
duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity.
Severe distress must be proved; but in many cases the extreme and outrageous
character of the defendant's conduct is in itself important evidence that the dis-
tress has existed.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 46, Comment j.
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bance. If one disturbs that tranquility in any respect, he will be liable
for the distress.
It must be noted, however, that emotional tranquility covers a
wide range of interests, some of which are independently actionable
while others are not, as the example of the outraged parents should
indicate. If the plaintiff experiences emotional distress over a nonac-
tionable concern, he shares with the defendant responsibility for his
own misery. Of course, the law cannot stop the plaintiff from ex-
periencing such distress, but neither should it compensate him.
Otherwise, any plaintiff who can claim substantial mental distress
might conveniently obtain damages for a claimed wrong to which the
law ordinarily denies recovery. Not even a requirement that the emo-
tional disturbance be foreseeable avoids this difficulty.
Wood v. United Air Lines, Inc. 9 illustrates the weakness of the
general position found in the Restatement. The plaintiffs were a sur-
viving husband and children of a passenger killed when the defen-
dant's airplane crashed. After news of the crash had been made pub-
lic, the plaintiffs contacted the defendant's agents to determine
whether their family member had been on that flight, as they sus-
pected. The defendant's agents responded that the woman had not
been on the flight. When pressed for further confirmation, these
agents suggested that perhaps she had missed the flight in order to
rendezvous with a lover. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
suggested that this statement might be actionable as an intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 40
It is well-established that one may not be liable for defamation of
the dead. 41 Even if the decedent had lived, her reputation would
not be a legally protectable interest of the plaintiffs. They may have
been emotionally distressed, but they were distressed over a matter
with which the law says they should not have been concerned. If the
law grants recovery for emotional distress, it makes ultimately futile
its limitations on recovery for defamation.
The legitimate objects of emotional tranquility should not be
viewed in a narrow or traditional fashion. 42  Nevertheless, unless the
39. 404 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1968).
40. Id. at 166.
41. See W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 745.
42. See Rockhill v. Pollard, 259 Ore. 54, 485 P.2d 28 (1971), in which the defendant, a
medical doctor, gave wholly inadequate treatment to the plaintiff's unconscious daughter, a
victim of an automobile accident. The defendant told the plaintiff that nothing was wrong with
her daughter, even though the child was ill and vomiting a great deal. After a cursory examina-
tion of'the plaintiff's daughter, the defendant forced the plaintiff, her daughter, and her
mother-in-law to wait outside his office in freezing weather until the plaintiff's husband arrived
to drive them home.
1977]
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broad view is taken that the law should protect emotional tranquility
in any and all respects, rational choices must be made as to the scope
of emotional tranquility.
D. Is Honor A Legitimate Interest?
In examining the scope of emotional tranquility, one question that
arises is whether honor or dignity may be a legitimate object of emo-
tional tranquility. The following discussion will assume that an insult
or attack on honor causes severe emotional distress. A further as-
sumption will be that the emotional distress extends only to insults or
attacks on honor, and not to emotional distress concerning some other
interest of the plaintiff.4 3
What values should be advanced by liability for the intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress? No less an authority than Dean Pound
stated that the law in its earliest stages protected the physical integ-
rity of the person, but not because it recognized the individual's
interest. Rather, injury to a person was thought to be an affront to his
kinsmen. The law protected a group interest against insult and, ac-
cordingly, diminished the opportunity for, and the attractiveness of,
retaliation by the group. Pound noted that in a later stage of legal
development, an individual interest in honor was recognized, but re-
mained tied to a social interest:
Again, when the individual interest is recognized, it is regarded
at first as an interest in one's honor, in one's standing among brave
men regardful of their honor, rather than an interest in the integ-
rity of the physical person. In Greek law every infringement of the
personality of another is ... contuinelia... ; the injury to honor,
the insult, being the essential point, not the injury to the body. In
Roman law, injury to the person is called iniuria, meaning origi-
Although the child suffered no permanent harm from the defendant's conduct, expert tes-
timony revealed that it was hazardous to take a child outside in freezing weather in clothing wet
from vomit. Testimony also revealed that vigorous medical treatment should have been ren-
dered immediately upon presentation of the plaintiff and her family to the defendant.
The court found that the plaintiff had experienced severe emotional distress as a result of the
defendant's conduct. It held that a jury could find the doctor's actions to he "outrageous in the
extreme." Id. at 31. The court reversed the trial court judgment of nonsuit, noting in particular
that defendant was under a professional obligation to plaintiff and her family, who came to him
for the express purpose of receiving emergency 'treatment after an accident.
43. Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal.3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970),
discussed in the text accompanying notes 33-35 supra, sanctioned recovery for racial epithets. It
is also arguably a case of racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 20 00e-2000e-17 (1970
& Supp. V 1975), in which racial epithets played an incidental role. This discussion covers only
those cases which involve attack on honor and no additional invasion of mental tranquility with
respect to a clearly legitimate object.
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nally insult, but coming to mean any willful disregard of another's
personality. In consequence the beginnings of law measure com-
position not by the extent of injury to the body, but by the extent
of injury to honor and the extent of the desire for vengeance thus
aroused, since the interest secured is really the social interest in
preserving the peace. 44
Thus, tort law is viewed as primitive in its roots. Civil liability is said
to have been substituted for reprisal and feud. 5 If one may bring suit
for injury, he, appeased, may be less likely to seek bloody retaliation
or, at the least, be unable to expect any sympathy for this conduct.
Liability promoted a basic, vital social interest in freedom from chao-
tic bloodshed.
Certainly, the intentional infliction of emotional distress can create
lust for revenge and violence. Perhaps it does not always promote
other values, like freedom of speech and of association. But the point
is that one should not draw a correlation between anger and conduct
disfavored under the law. Society should not create tort liability
whenever violence is threatened, because violence is too erratic an
indicator of legitimate values.4 6
44. Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 357 (1915).
45. See Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARV. L. REV. 315 (1894).
If appeasement from anger or violence producing conduct is truly a goal of tort law, then we
must consider whether conduct may become objectionable merely because a substantial number
of persons might resort to violence in order to register their disapproval of, or to retaliate for,
such conduct. Unless a society is to be ruled by the savage instincts of less than a majority of
the populace, the latent violence to be suppressed through a substituted tort action must reflect
a grievance legitimate on grounds other than its potential for evoking violence. One can easily
imagine regions, of the country in which a person might revile or even cogently criticize reli-
gious beliefs and expose himself to the threat of physical violence. In the not too distant past,
one's eating a meal in public with a member of a different race might expose him to the threat
of serious violence. See, e.g., Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1963). Obviously,
neither form of conduct is considered tortious, since the law is unwilling to condemn the con-
duct on grounds other than its potential for generating reactive violence. Appeasement offers
guidance only when we have determined with reference to other values that certain conduct
should be discouraged. Tort liability reflects a judgment that law, not violence, should stamp
out or express disapproval of undesirable conduct. Mindless violence should itself be stamped
out by the law, not shape the content of the law.
46. In theory, the criminal law may punish the use of "fighting words." Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). However, the criminalization of "offensive" words is not per-
mitted. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). The Supreme Court's manipulation of this
distinction suggests that the scope of the "fighting words" doctrine is quite narrow. For a collec-
tion of the cases and commentary, see N. DORSEN, P. BENDER, & B. NEUBORNE, I EMERSON,
HABER & DoRSEN'S POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 392-95, 401-12,
621-46 (4th ed. 1976).
In any event, a criminal sanction provides the means to remove the speaker and his fighting




Even when separated from its potential for reactive violence, honor
has a tenuous claim for legal protection. Honor or dignity can be
considered in two senses. The first is an internal sense, which we call
self-respect-a conviction that one possesses the qualities which he
or she considers the equipment of an admirable person. An insult can
affect self-respect in two ways. If A attacks B's honor, but is unable to
dislodge B's self-respect, B has of course suffered no loss. At worst, B
will be aware of A's enmity or A's belief that B does not possess
certain admirable qualities. B may be better off for having an indica-
tion of A's attitude toward him. B might come to even worse suffering
at a later time were he to remain unaware of A's attitude toward him.
If, on the other hand, A's conduct causes B to cease to regard
himself favorably, it is difficult to say that A has inflicted a loss on B.
True, B has changed, and A is in part responsible for that change.
But if self-respect is to have meaning, then B is the ultimate arbiter
of that quality and can hardly hold A responsible for his change in
position. Alternatively, if B's previous self-respect had been based on
illusion, and A has punctured B's illusion, then the law would be
placed in the position of compensating for lost illusion.
The law cannot protect self-respect, which by its nature is not de-
pendent on outside protection. If self-respect is not a legitimate ob-
ject of protection by the law, then mental distress relating to attacks
on self-respect cannot create legal liability.
The second sense in which honor or dignity can be considered is an
external sense. Viewed externally, honor represents the deference
and respect shown a person as the holder of various qualities, attri-
butes or beliefs. Obviously, A's insult, if he communicates it to
others, must assert a lack of such qualities as to lead the others to
hold B in less esteem. This presupposes that society has a consensus
on those qualities worthy of esteem. Many insults lack this quality. If,
in a public setting, A hurls the epithet "bastard" at B, he may gravely
wound B's sensibilities; but it is most unlikely that others will think
less of B. Indeed, they may think less of A. At present, even were
this epithet generally taken as an assertion of fact, the illegitimate
status of a person is not regarded as bearing on the esteem or defer-
ence due that individual. 47 Furthermore, if understood in its nor-
mal, non-literal sense, the epithet reflects so much of a subjective,
possibly unfounded opinion, that few would consider it and even
fewer would uncritically accept it.
In this latter sense, much of the billingsgate unloosed upon others
causes no injury to their honor. When the insult does call into ques-
47. See Walker v. Tucker, 220 Ky. 363, 295 S.W. 138 (1927).
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tion the respect due the plaintiff, the question arises whether the
plaintiff actually merits respect on this score. The law hardly could
compensate the plaintiff when he does not possess the honorable
qualities called into question by the defendant. The natural emotional
distress occasioned should not add to his claim. 48  If the defendant
falsely calls these qualities into question, plaintiff must look to the law
of defamation for redress.
Thus, protection should depend on the sense in which "honor" is
employed. Only if honor is taken in an external sense may the plain-
tiff hope for protection, and then within the general limits set out by
the law of defamation.
DISINTERESTED MALEVOLENCE AS A BASIS OF LIABILITY
Although the plaintiff may have no legitimate interest in honor,
perhaps the defendant should not be allowed to make life unpleasant
for others without any legitimate gain for himself. Indeed, the defen-
dant may even be harming himself and should be preserved from his
own malevolent influence. 49
Modern law increasingly recognizes, at least in situations that are
not yet well-defined by existing legal rules, that a motive to harm
another may color an otherwise neutral act.50 The situation, then, is
this: the plaintiff experiences an unpleasant, annoying disturbance of
his mental tranquility. No other interest of his is invaded. The defen-
dant has created this situation because he delights in the discomfort
of others, and has no justification such as the fi'eedom to speak his
mind.
Although this situation may be conceivable, it seems at best ex-
ceedingly rare in actual experience. Very seldom are we likely to en-
counter such "disinterested malevolence." Freedom to have an opin-
ion of another and to manifest that opinion are ever present as justifi-
cation for much conduct that is considered rude and annoying. The
law should not attempt to deal with unlikely situations.
Consider a case which involved a cruel and heartless act, but which
was hardly a gratuitous infliction of mental distress. In Swanson v.
Swanson,51 the plaintiff and the defendant were brothers. They had
48. A number of cases give protection tnder the guise of a right to privacy. They hold
defendant liable for the publication of true facts, if those facts were private before defendant's
publications. See Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927) (public posting of debt
notice). The theory is effectively criticized in Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and
Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROn, 326 (1966). Not even the right to privacy gives
protection when third parties know the true facts before the plaintiff's publication.
49. But see J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. IV (1859).
50. See W. PRossER, supra note 10, § 5.
51. 121 I11. App.2d 182, 257 N.E.2d 194 (1970).
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an invalid mother, toward whom neither willingly accepted total re-
sponsibility for care. The defendant placed the mother in a nursing
home and gave only his own name as the nearest relative to be
notified in case of emergency or death. The plaintiff visited his
mother at this home, but never left his telephone number with the
management nor indicated a desire to be contacted in case of
emergency or death. When the mother died, the defendant arranged
for her burial without informing his brother of her death. The plaintiff
discovered his mother's death only after her burial and suffered emo-
tional distress as a result of not being able to attend her funeral. The
court upheld a directed verdict for the defendant because the plain-
tiff's distress was not severe enough. He experienced some sleepless
nights and nightmares, but nothing so serious as to cause him to seek
medical assistance. Perhaps, had the plaintiff's distress been more se-
vere, the court would have allowed the imposition of liability.
Undoubtedly, the defendant through his conduct indicated that he
felt that his brother had shown insufficient interest in their mother
and had left the defendant with a disproportionate share of the re-
sponsibility for her care. Perhaps the defendant's beliefs on this sub-
ject were erroneous and misplaced, but a court should be unwilling
to resolve these questions in order to hold that defendant had in-
flicted mental distress solely to satisfy sadistic impluses.
INHERENT INEFFECTIVENESS OF RESTATEMENT LIMITATIONS
A. The "Outrageousness" Requirement
The limitations in the Restatement do not overcome the previously
noted difficulties. For example, a requirement of outrageousness pro-
vides no adequate limitation of liability, since it is in no way tied to
the legitimacy of the object of mental tranquility. Outrageousness can
be relevant only if mental tranquility, divorced from its objects, is
itself a value. If applicable, the outrageousness limitation might se-
verely limit liability, but at great administrative expense; the concept
has little meaning except in extraordinary cases. 52 For that reason,
moreover, its invocation often would take the defendant by surprise.
The Restatement imposes liability for "outrageous" conduct; that
is, conduct to which the average member of the community would
respond by exclaiming, "Outrageous!" 53 This circular definition tells
52. See Rockhill v. Pollard, 259 Ore. 54, 60, 485 P.2d 28, 31-32 (1971), in which the court
briefly lists the types of cases falling into the category of outrageous conduct, including outra-
geous practical jokes, oppressive behavior in credit collection and business relations, threats of
physical harm, and abusive or alarming behavior toward ill persons or pregnant women.
53. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 46, Comment d.
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us very little except that the defendant's fate hangs upon the emo-
tional reaction of the twelve jurors who hear his case. Of course, the
judge maintains his traditional control over the jury through the use
of a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. But in
the most difficult cases, the ones in which there is not unanimous
agreement about typical, recurring situations, this control by the
judge will be meaningless or capricious. On what basis may the judge
conclude that the average member of the community would be
clearly wrong in exclaiming, "Outrageous!"?
A supporter of the "Outrageous!" test might argue that tort law is
permeated with concepts such as "unreasonable" and "defective,"
which are no less ambiguous. This argument overlooks the essentially
residual nature of the "Outrageous!" test, which attempt to cope
with conduct untouched by rules of a comparatively high degree of
particularity. If one examines negligence as a basis of liability, itself a
fairly recent development, 54 one realizes that fiom the beginning the
law has attempted to give specific content to the negligence concept.
Although the Restatement 55 and various judges 56 have offered
generalized definitions of negligence, the term has summed up a
standard of increasing particularity. Rather than a lapse from the be-
havior of the mythical "reasonable man," negligence more accurately
consists of breach of statutes, 57 breach of customs, 58 breach of stan-
dards established by professional associations,59 and breach of stan-
dards established by leaders of the relevant industry, 60 to name just a
few facets of negligence. 61 The courts would have broken long ago
under the weight of automobile collision litigation if rules of the road,
first established by custom 62 and later enacted by the legislature, 63
had not been established to supply the content for a concept of a
reasonable man as automobile driver.
The emotional distress cases present too many one-of-a-kind situa-
tions. No expert can set up a standard of outrageousness. Indeed, the
54. Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850) is commonly thought the seminal American
negligence case.
55. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, §§ 282-284.
56. E.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
57. E.g., Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920).
58. E.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
59. E.g., Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968).
60. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 17.4 (1956).
61. To name one other important example, the federal government now has authority to set
detailed standards through the administrative process for consumer products. 15 U.S.C. §
2051-2081 (Supp. III 1973).
62. See Clay v. Wood, 170 Eng. Rep. 732 (K.B. 1803).
63. See Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920).
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Restatement even disavows reliance on criminality as a possible de-
terminant of outrageousness. 64 One can easily imagine the chaos that
would result if, in product liability cases, the jury were called upon as
average members of the community, after hearing the primary facts,
to decide whether they would exclaim "Defective!" One might main-
tain that the most imaginative inflictions of emotional distress would
go unremedied if the outrageousness requirement were rejected.
Nevertheless, one must consider the price exacted when a vague,
ambiguous standard is retained as a catch-all for a small class of cases.
In practice, the bounds of outrageousness have quickly broken
down to include conduct not nearly so colorful or wicked as, for
example, sending a woman a dead rat wrapped in a newspaper. 65 In
one recent case, Stanard v. Bolin, 6 . the defendant broke his engage-
ment to marry the plaintiff. Unlike the defendant in Halio v. Lurie,6 7
he did not take the occasion to make biting personal comments. No
doubt the plaintiff's emotional distress was real and severe, and her
reaction must be considered as quite normal. One wonders, though,
whether failure to enter a contemplated marriage is, as the court pre-
sumably viewed it, conduct intolerable in a civilized community. 68
Two factors account for this breakdown in the meaning of outra-
geous conduct. First, if the fact-finder determines that the plaintiff has
suffered severe emotional distress, it can hardly avoid a finding of
outrageousness, unless it finds a severe reaction to be abnormal or
unforeseeable. 69 As in Stanard, severe emotional distress is quite
normal or foreseeable in the wake of a broken engagement. Once this
relationship is established, outrageousness follows quite naturally. Al-
corn further illustrates that to deny a finding of outrageousness in the
face of severe emotional injury would put the court in the unattrac-
tive position of appearing to condone racial epithets.
Second, in cases in which the plaintiff claims emotional distress
with respect to a legitimate object of concern, he may often recover
on a showing of negligence. 70 Once a court grants independent
legitimacy to emotional tranquility as such, it need have little hesita-
64. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 46, Comment d.
65. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1931).
66. 88 Wash.2d 614, 565 P.2d 94 (1977).
67. 15 App. Div.2d 62, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1961).
68. Stanard eliminated recovery for lost social standing or financial position. Thus, plaintiff's
recovery rested on the mental anguish caused by not marrying the plaintiff.
69. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 46, Comment j.
70. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); Rodrigues v.
State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970); Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372




tion in predicating liability on a finding of negligent-or at least
non-outrageous -conduct. The outrageousness of defendant's conduct
may be an indicator of severe emotional distress. However, if severity
may be otherwise established to the court's satisfaction, it has little
need to require more than proof of negligence.
B. The Severity of Distress Requirement
In practice, severity of distress is not a significant limitation on
liability. Nausea, sleepless nights and lack of appetite are a familiar
litany which, even when substantiated, would have seemed trivial to
an earlier generation. Under the modern view, however, they are the
touchstones of this exceptional liability. 71
As observed earlier in this Article, the existence of severe emo-
tional distress may dilute the requirement of outrageousness. The Re-
statement comments also contemplate that the outrageous character of
the defendant's conduct may substantiate the severity of the plaintiff's
emotional distress .72 As the meaning of outrageousness is diluted,
the requirement of severe emotional distress is also diluted. The
courts have held that once a defendant has been found liable on the
basis of emotional distress, the plaintiff's distress, if genuine, is se-
vere enough to be compensable.
Rockhill v. Pollard 73 is illustrative of this development in the area
of emotional distress. The plaintiff was the mother of an injured child
to whom the defendant, a physician, gave inadequate treatment. The
child was taken to another doctor and suffered no permanent damage
from the claimed malpractice. The mother alleged that the defen-
dant's rudeness caused her severe emotional distress. She became
nervous, was unable to sleep, lost her appetite, and took tranquiliz-
ers. These symptoms were claimed to have extended over a two-year
period. With some misgiving, the court ruled that the symptoms
were sufficient to make a case for the jury on the issue of severe
emotional distress. Perhaps a more realistic appraisal would have rec-
ognized that worry over the safety of one's child would be genuine
and that severity of the worry would relate to the amount of damages,
not to liability.
71. See, e.g., Alcorn v. Albro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal.3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr.
88 (1970); Haljo v. Lurie, 15 App. Div.2d 62, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1961).
72. The RESTATEMENT provides that: "Severe distress must be proved; but in many cases the
extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's conduct is in itself important evidence that
the distress has existed." RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 46, Comment j.
73. 259 Ore. 54, 485 P.2d 28 (1971). See note 42 supra.
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CONCLUSION
The Restatement (Second) of Torts makes a helpful contribution to
tort law by broadening liability beyond the traditional forms for inten-
tionally inflicted emotional distress. The difficulty with the Restate-
ment approach lies in the protection of emotional tranquility for
interests not themselves worthy of legal protection. Recovery for in-
sult or affront to honor represents the most important area in which
this parting from the common law doctrines works an undesirable re-
sult. Not even the Restatement requirements of outrageousness or
severity of distress can adequately hold in check this impermissibly
broadened liability. Compelling reasons, such as the inability to de-
fine the scope of compensable injuries and unfair surprise to the de-
fendant, stand opposed to such broad protection of the individual's
interests.
